Racial separation may be the result of many factors:
to some degree by inclusion of local public goods, but only if they were highly valued.
In those cases, proximity to the public goods worked against the disutility of mixed neighborhood so integrated neighborhoods became more likely. If the public goods were not highly valued, though, the segregation persisted or unstable and chaotic neighborhoods persisted.
Despite all efforts and statements to the contrary, American cities were still quite segregated at the turn of the 21st century. Massey and Denton (1987) , for example, estimated that the likelihood that black and white individuals shared a common neighbor hood in 60 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas of the United States was 5%. Even more recently, Yinger (1998) , Darity and Mason (1998) , and Ladd as they want, but their neighborhoods have people or vacant lots next door, across the street, down the street, and on the other side of the backyard fence. The second extension is more substantive. It inves tigates the degree to which adding spatially defined local public goods to individuals' utility functions can undermine the strength of Schelling's segrega tion result.
Section I provides a very brief review of the Schelling linear environment. The second section describes our agent-based theoretical structure before Section III reports the results of the initial geographic extension of the Schelling environment. Racial segregation still emerges as the collective result of mild individual preferences for homogene ity even in a two dimensional context. Section IV then adds local public goods to the mix. The ten dency toward segregation persists, but it is dimin ished somewhat in circumstances in which individ uals value proximity to the public good. A final section offers some brief conclusions.
I. The Schelling Model Schelling (1969) created a simple model of a neighborhood and individual behavior. In order to demonstrate the relationship between collective results and individual intent, his neighborhoods were represented as lines, with black residents rep resented by the symbol "+" and whites by the sym bol "0." An arbitrary selected neighborhood with 9 blacks and 10 whites might then, for example, be represented by:
0+000++0+00++00+++0
Schelling equipped the actors in his neighborhoods with a simple decision rule about where they want ed to live. If fewer than half of any resident's near est 4 neighbors were of the same race, then the res ident would move to the nearest point for which half of his eight nearest neighbors would be of the same race. Applying this rule to the neighborhood displayed above, an equilibrium neighborhood within which nobody would have any further incen tive to move given observed location of other indi viduals would be:
0000+++++000000++++
Schelling's simple linear model confirmed his con jecture with the resulting Nash equilibrium display ing complete segregation. Although each individual would have been satisfied to live in an area in which half of his neighbors were of the opposite race, complete segregation was the collective result of a simple decision rule consistent with those prefer ences.
IL Extending the Schelling Model with
Artificial Neighborhoods
The current work described here was designed to explore the robustness of the Schelling result with in a dynamic, agent-based model. It was rooted within an "artificial society" in which the interac tion of agents who live within simple social and economic environments were simulated over time.
In general, artificial societies have (1) agents with internal states and preferences, (2) an environment that serves as "the medium over which agents inter act" (Epstein and Axtell, 1996) , and (3) rules that determine the behavior of the agents and how they interact with the environment. The variant exploit ed here considered a 2 dimensional environment within which residents could decide whether or not to move on the basis of a set of behavioral rules designed explicitly to mimic the Schelling environ ment. Neighborhoods were to be represented by grids of a known size; and each square in the grid represented one of 4 things: a black resident, a white resident, an uninhabited space in a neighbor hood, or (eventually) a public good. We let resi dents' preferences be represented by a utility func tion of the form:
In writing equation (1) The functional representation of equation (1) depicted the case in which residents' utilities were dependent solely on the racial composition of their neighborhoods. The specific form was chosen so that neighbors of same race would improve utility, but the marginal utility of a same-race neighbor would depreciate exponentially with distance. Indeed, if distance were a continuous variable, then the "marginal utility" of a like neighbor with respect to distance would be:
Equation (1) Residents were assumed to move to a better loca tion if their utility at their present location fell below some specified threshold. A resident who was surrounded by equal numbers of opposite-race and own race neighbors would, for example, achieve a utility value of zero at his or her present location according to equation (1). Given a moving threshold value of zero, he or she and would not want to move; but a resident with threshold of more than 0 would be so inclined. Such an individual, with a threshold of say 10, would require a much greater percentage of own-race neighbors in the surrounding squares to be satisfied with a current location. The role of the vision parameter should now be clear. The vision parameter defined the size of a "local neighborhood" under consideration when moves were contemplated. A large range of vision meant that neighbors who lived relatively far away affected residents' utilities; of course, a small vision parameter focused residents' attention on only their closest neighbors. The careful reader may have also thought, and correctly so, that choosing an "anchoring" parameter greater than 2 for the util ity function in equation (1) would allow for differ ences in the intensity of racial preference. The prac tical implications of these differences were, however, captured and examined by adjusting the moving threshold, instead. We now turn to show how decisions to move were implemented and how they supported a work able definition of equilibrium. Suppose that the util ity of some resident j at his or her current location were calculated to lie above some specified thresh old. This resident would then not want to move. If the character of his or her neighborhood were later influenced by the moves of others, however, then resident j could have a change of heart and want to move, and this complication will eventually be accommodated.
Before describing how, though, suppose that the utility of some other resident k at his or her current location were calculated to fall below the moving threshold. He or she would then relocate to the square within his or her vision that maximized utility. If this move displaced a current resident, then that resident would simply move to an open square found in the direction of resident k's initial location.
The moving criterion was applied to every resi dent in sequence until the moving decisions of all had been examined. Since any move made late in this sequence could change the decisions of resi dents whose decisions had already been contem plated, however, the entire process had to be repeat ed as long as one move was observed at any point in the sequence. Equilibrium was ultimately defined as a location pattern for all residents such that the location grids for two successive and com plete rounds across all residents were identical. In other words, a neighborhood was deemed to be in equilibrium if no single resident displayed any fur ther inclination to move. Notice that this equilibri um concept was entirely consistent the convention for a weak Nash equilibrium because it achieved a condition in which nobody would want to change behavior (i.e., move) given the observed location of all neighbors within his or her field of vision. effects of changing the model's parameters. Initial conditions were produced in each case by random ly assigning a zero, one or "plus" to each grid square (pluses represented uninhabited squares). Each assignment was produced as an independent draw from a distribution that gave relatively likeli hood weights of 0.25, 0.25 and 0.5 to white resi dents, black residents, or no inhabitants, respective ly. The resulting pseudo-randomly generated array of zeros, ones, and pluses were therefore expected to display an equal number of white and black resi dents scattered among a twice as many uninhabited locations.
The left side of the top panel in Figure 1 displays such an initial neighborhood. The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows a Nash equilibrium for the same neighborhood that was established after 21 com plete iterations that considered the incentive to move of each resident because nobody chose to move after the 20th round. Finally, the grids por trayed on the right sides of the two panels of Figure  1 display utility levels for each of the residents. The initial distribution is shown on the top, and the equi librium distribution is shown on the bottom. Notice that a visual pattern of segregation is clear in the equilibrium neighborhood, and that total utility is higher across the equilibrium neighborhood than it was in the initial random configuration. We used these patterns to draw conclusions about the power of personal preferences in creating segregate neigh borhoods by comparing initial patterns with their associated equilibria configurations and the size of the resulting gains in aggregate utility.
Ill: The Role of Individual Preferences on Racial Composition Alone
We begin by reporting results from two artificial neighborhoods in which residents' utility functions took the form portrayed in equation (1) The first case simulated a neighborhood of resi dents with Schelling-type low utility thresholds for (not) moving utility and relatively small neighbor hood vision; i.e., a relatively small collection of locations formed the effective local neighborhoods upon which residents' utilities were generated. The vision parameter was, more specifically, set so that residents effectively defined their "local neighbor hoods" in terms of the surrounding 36 grid-cells. In a small town, this area could be a block or perhaps a single apartment building. The second case expanded residents' vision so that the size of a neighborhood rose from 36 to 80, and Schelling's conjecture continued to hold. The segregation in the equilibrium neighborhood was, in fact, even more obvious than before. Indeed, the equilibrium grid broke into two areas: the middle, dominated by a huge cluster of ones and the outer edges, where smaller clusters of zeros were gath ered. This result suggests that segregation is posi tively correlated to the vision parameter?an obser vation that is also consistent with Schelling's hypothesis. If segregation were a function of the aggregate preferences of a neighborhood, then a larger collection of individuals should be expected to produce a larger degree of segregation; i.e., resi dents who are concerned with far-away neighbors will tend to live in more segregated neighborhoods. ++ 00 + 000 + 1 + 11 + + * 10 12* 1311 9 + 4+23 0 + + + 0 + + 000*1000** 3 + + 5 + 9 1112+ -11 9 7 4 + 100 + *00*1000**000 -22 2 * * 1 2 * -710 1112* 9 7 5 10*1+1+ + 00000 + +0 -21 +3 + 4**6 11121312* + 8 0 + + 1*11110*0*000Q 4**3*9 10 832*11* 1413118 + 0 + 11111+1+0000 + + +5 + 49 121211 +3 + 8 121313+ + 0001111011+0 + 00 + + 65239 1213-12107 + 3 + 1212+ + 0 + 00 + 1111+110000+ 6 + 1-3* 11121211+ 7 3 3 8 109 + 00+++****1111+0** 32******* 1010 7 1 * 9 * * 01*1110*1*1110*00 02*898-7+7* 10 832*98 + 111110 + 111+ + 000 * + 9 10107 5-3* 567**588 111101+ + +0 + 11+ + 0+ 69 1010-96 + + + 2 + 22 + + 7 + 1+1111+ + 00001100* 7* 10 874**6752-1-1 34* 1* + 1*0 + 0000 + + 010+ 5**6*-1*6898**1 -11* 10010001000*0**11 3 -3-32 -1 2 4 -77 8 7 + 4 + + 1 0 The trade-off between public goods and racial preference was incorporated within a utility func tion that explicitly reflected the relative value of a public good. More specifically, utility for each indi vidual in the artificial society now took the form:
i=0 k=0
where d(j) was the distance of resident j from the nearest public good, a represented the overall value of the public good, and (3 represented the impor tance of being close to the public good. Notice that the marginal utility of the public good, as depicted in equation (2), declined exponentially with dis tance in exactly the same way as the utility or disu tility of neighbors of the same or different race. The public good's overall ability to influence utility was, however, defined by the a and (3 as well as vision. It is helpful to think of a as a "power" para meter and (3 as a proximity parameter. To see why, notice that a worked as a multiplier so that dou bling a doubled the amount of utility a resident receives from a public good. Meanwhile, (3 reflect ed the significance of being located close to or far away from the public good. While a and (3 directly affected the strength of a public good, though, be clear that vision had only an indirect effect. Only residents who could "see" the public good could receive utility from its "consumption."
If vision were set so that the nearest 36 grid squares were "in sight," then the only the nearest 36 residents to the public good could receive any value. And if vision were expanded to include two more "concentric cir cles" of grids, then nearest 80 neighbors would receive utility from the good. The cases explored below were defined by various combinations of these three critical parameters with the moving threshold set at 0 and again at 10.
IV.l. The Effect of Weak Public Goods
Two cases located 4 weakly valued public goods at specific points in the simulated neighborhood.
Case 3, for example, simulated a neighborhood where the value of the public goods was relatively small for residents with limited vision a low utility threshold for moving (i.e., a = 1, 0 = 8, threshold = 0 and vision = 3). Notice that a = 1 and 0 = 8 meant that a resident adjacent to a public good would receive 8 utils from the use of that good, a relative ly small amount when one considers that the resi dent could receive the same amount of utility if she were surrounded by own-race neighbors. The low threshold value meant, though, that residents were easily content with a low-level of utility.
The grids in Figure 3 show that this environment produced little in the way of support for the Schelling hypothesis. Residents did not move towards public goods, either; and so the result that racial clustering was not evident was more a reflec tion of low-utility expectations than the power of the public good. The histogram of initial utility helps to explain this lack of movement. Since the threshold value was set at zero, residents moved only when their utilities fell below zero; but few residents fell below the threshold even in the initial, random configuration.
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good boxes" in the equilibrium neighborhood for this case suggested that residents could be satisfied in integrated neighborhoods as long as they are able to consume a public good. However, these "inte grated neighborhoods" were really single-race clus ters that were forced to be to each other by the power of the public good. The histogram for this case showed that this clus tering produced large changes in utility. The initial, randomly generated neighborhood supported utility levels that were mostly between 0 and 9; indeed, only a few residents fell below 0 and a similarly small number of residents rose above 9. In equilibri um, though, residents with much higher utilities were abundant. The modal level of utility was now 8, and
there were approximately the same number of resi dents with utility greater than 9 as those with utility less than 9. This distribution supported a 76% increase in the mean utility across the community.
The histogram also showed that more than half the residents were unable to reach the threshold level of utility; i.e., they did not move because there were no locations within their vision for which utility would be higher than where they were. The relative weak ness of the public good seemed to set a relatively low limit on potential resident utility.
Before moving on to other cases in which either vision or the utility value of the public goods were increased, it is worthwhile to pause briefly to dis cuss the robustness of the results reported thus far.
Each case was examined across multiple random ized runs of the model to assess the stability of at least the qualitative results. Testing stability was, of course, difficult because the results could only be examined visually and were extremely path depen dent. The model was, more specifically, designed to create visual representations of equilibrium neigh borhoods derived from a specific initial geographi cal distribution; and so there was no reason to expect that any given equilibrium would match another. Segregation was easily visible for Case 4, for example, but was it a robust conclusion derived from the parameterization of utility or an idiosyn cratic manifestation of the initial conditions?
The most efficient test of robustness looked at the distribution across the population of the per centage increases in utility generated as the neigh borhood moved from its initial configuration to its ultimate equilibrium. Convergence in these distrib utions across multiple runs would suggest that they were generated by similar patterns of movement 
IV.2. Weak Public Goods with Extended Vision
Case 5 was identical to Case 4 except for the vision parameter; residents could now "see" up to 5 (rather than 3) concentric squares away. Extended vision had three effects on resident utility. First of all, the utility of any individual was now affected by up to 80 neighbors instead of 36. Secondly, each resident could now move to any of 80 houses or lots instead of 36. And finally, public goods now pro vided utility for residents up to 5 squares away. As a result, extended vision increased the maximum possible level of utility and made the moving threshold value more easily obtainable. As expect ed, extended vision produced "happier" neighbor hoods in which the majority of residents were above the moving threshold utility value; but two types of clustering persisted in equilibrium. The equilibrium grid exhibited extreme own-race clus tering in addition to clustering around public goods. On the whole, though, segregation was stronger than in the equilibria depicted for Case 4. 
IV.3. The Effect of Strong Public Goods
Two cases investigated the effect of a strongly valued public good on segregation. Case 6 returned vision to 3 (36 squares) but changed a and (3. The value of P was smaller than in previous cases, sig nifying an increase in the importance of a resident's proximity to a public good. The importance of proximity was further increased by the increase in the value of a. As a result, residents adjacent to a public good could now receive a utility bonus of 6 utils, while residents living two squares away from the good gained only 1.5 utils by consuming the good. It was expected that these changes would
give the public goods a magnet-like effect and pro duce residents who would fight for spots adjacent to public goods.
Competition for spots next to public goods was fierce in this case. Residents did not "settle-down" even after 30 rounds, and movement continued 22 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIST especially in proximity to the public goods. Churn ing in these areas resulted in utility values that were below the threshold level, but it also eventually pro duced relatively integrated neighborhoods. Integra tion prevented residents from achieving high levels of utility, though, and residents tried to find small clusters of own-race residences near the public goods Case 7 duplicated Case 6 except that a was set equal to 2. This made the value of the public good twice as high as it was in Cases 3, 4, and 5 (ceteris paribus) and 25% stronger than it was in Case 6. Did this change exaggerate the "magnetic effect" of the public good and finally overcome Schelling type segregation? Yes, to a large degree. The areas surrounding public goods were not significantly segregated and that the highest utility values flowed to the residents who were located closest to the pub lic goods. Unlike Case 6, where the majority of res idents continued to try to move because they were below the moving threshold level and opportunities still existed, most Case 7 residents achieved utility values that exceeded the threshold Indeed, the increased power of the public good pushed the res idents near public goods above the threshold level despite the racial diversity of their neighborhoods. The result was a stable, relatively integrated, and happy equilibrium neighborhood. This stability could not be achieved in Case 6 where the public good was not strong enough to overpower the disu tility of integration. It is important to note that Cases 6 and 7 pro duced different results, but that the differences were not as visually apparent as they were in earlier com parisons. The levels of segregation depicted in Cases 6 and 7 were really quite similar. Indeed,
given the qualitative character of the visually dis played results, it was difficult to make a robust claim that the neighborhoods depicted in Case 7 were more or less integrated than the neighbor hoods depicted in Case 6. The real difference between the two cases lay in the dynamics of resi dents' desires to move or stay put. Case 7, with its very strong public good, portrayed a stable, equilib rium neighborhood inhabited by relatively happy people; but Case 6, with its slightly less valued pub lic good, could not sustain a stable equilibrium of satisfied residents. Between the stability of segre gated neighborhoods clustered around weakly val ued public goods and the stability of more integrat ed neighborhoods clustered around strongly valued public goods must lie cases of instability and unrest.
V. Concluding Remarks
Each of the cases simulated here produced equi libria with some degree of racial segregation. The results therefore sustained Schelling's conjecture that individual intent is not necessarily related to the collective result of neighborhood segregation.
In all of the simulations, each individual would have been content with a local neighborhood in which approximately half of the residents were of the same race; but all individuals acting together with this motive seemed to produce segregated neighborhoods. The Schelling conjecture was undermined to some degree by inclusion of local public goods, but only if they were highly valued. In those cases, proximity to the public goods worked against the disutility of mixed neighbor hood so integrated neighborhoods became more likely. If the public goods were not highly valued though, the segregation persisted or unstable and chaotic neighborhoods persisted.
The high degree of segregation exhibited here was clearly dependent on residents' utility func tions. The functions employed here assumed that individuals value living near people who are like them. However, a myriad other real-world variables (like public goods) could also play a role. Social status, class, income and proximity to work quickly fill a list of variables that were ignored. Clearly, these omitted variables could easily play a bigger role in resident utility than race or proximity to pub lic goods. Nonetheless, this work perhaps offers a partial explanation for why American cities contin ue to be segregated and/or unstable.
